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Abstract 
Henry VII’s reign has been the subject of increased study in recent years, in 
particular his relationship with the nobility and his determination to ensure the 
loyalty of his subjects. Henry VII was adept at utilising the numerous methods at 
his disposal in order to keep his crown. This article makes a contribution to this 
broader understanding of Henry VII’s reign by focusing on one document, a 
letter to the city of Carlisle dated 15 February 1498, which ordered that the 
statutes relating to retaining and the distribution of liveries should be upheld. 
While the letter has been noted by previous historians, it has not been the 
subject of a detailed examination. This article explains the significance of the 
document for understanding the reign of Henry VII, his attitude towards 
retaining and the relationship between royal and urban governments in the late 
fifteenth century. This particular letter includes two novel features not found in 
other letters to towns about retaining. First, there is an explicit reference to the 
possibility of a Scottish invasion. Second, the city’s government were all 
required to swear oaths of fealty to Henry VII. Although, the letter confirms the 
general picture that Henry VII was keen to remind his subjects of their duties 
and obligations to the crown and that he built on and adapted Yorkist 
innovations, it highlights his specific concern in early 1498, in the aftermath of 
the Perkin Warbeck conspiracy that James IV of Scotland may still invade. 
Keywords: Henry VII; Carlisle; urban government; James IV; Perkin Warbeck; 
bastard feudalism. 
 
Stanley Chrimes stated that his 1972 biography of Henry VII was to be regarded as 
‘an interim report’ on the state of knowledge of Henry VII’s reign and that ‘much 
arduous research’ was required before the reign could be properly understood.2 Since 
that publication, and especially over the past decade, Henry VII’s reign has been the 
subject of much historical research, although there is no modern biography on the 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Dr Neil Murphy for his comments on an earlier draft of this article and the two 
anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. 
2 S.B Chrimes, Henry VII, (London, 1972), xii. 
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scale of those for Edward II, Edward III and Henry IV.3 Our understanding of Henry’s 
reign had previously suffered from its liminal position in history with many viewing it 
as either an epilogue to late medieval history or a prelude to early modern history.4 
The reign is now studied in its own right and it can be reasonably speculated that 
Henry VII is currently enjoying more attention from scholars than at any point during 
the previous half millennium. Likewise, it is possible to suggest that Henry VII 
currently attracts as much interest from academic, although not popular, historians as 
the man he usurped, Richard III.5 This article makes a further contribution to this 
developing understanding of Henry VII’s reign, in particular his relations with urban 
communities and the North. 
In developing a better understanding of Henry VII’s reign historians have 
either drawn attention to newly discovered documents6 or reconsidered known aspects 
of the reign from a new perspective, such as the household or his plans for the 
upbringing and education of his first born son, Arthur.7 This article highlights the 
significance of one particular document, the significance of which has gone unnoticed 
which illustrates key aspects of Henry VII’s reign. The document examined here 
survives in Cumbria Record Office. It is a letter, written under the privy seal, from 
Henry VII to the mayor and brethren of the city of Carlisle and is dated 15 February 
1498 (‘the xv day of Ffebruary the xiijth yere of oure Reigne’). The letter states that no 
man from the city was to be retained ‘by lyveree baggnen clothing cognoissance or 
                                                          
3 The most recent academic biography of Henry VII is Sean Cunningham, Henry VII (London, 2007). 
While Cunningham’s biography of Henry is of a high standard, it is only 285 pages of text, 
significantly shorter than recent volumes in the English Monarchs series by Yale University Press: 
Chris Given-Wilson, Henry IV (London, 2016), W. Mark Ormrod, Edward III (London, 2011); 
Seymour Philips, Edward II (London, 2010). A further study has focused on the later years of the 
king’s life: Thomas Penn, Winter King: The Dawn of Tudor England (London, 2011). 
4 Steven Gunn, ‘Henry VII in Context: Problems and Possibilities’, History, 92 (2007), 301-2; P.R. 
Cavill, The English Parliaments of Henry VII, 1485-1504, (Oxford, 2009), 1-18. 
5 This has been a recent development. Consider, in contrast, comments made by Michael Hicks quarter 
of a century ago: ‘Richard III is now perhaps the most popular and most studied of English kings.’ 
Michael Hicks, Richard III and His Rivals: Magnates and their Motives in the Wars of the Roses 
(London, 1991) 281. By no means, however, can it be argued that Henry VII has overtaken Richard III 
but academic research on the two reigns is now more even.  
6 For instance: Paul Cavill, ‘The Enforcement of the Penal Statutes in the 1490s: Some New Evidence’,  
Historical Research, 82 (2009), 482-92; James Ross, "Contrary to the ryght and to the order of the 
lawe": New Evidence of Edmund Dudley’s Activities on Behalf of Henry VII in 1504, English 
Historical Review, cxxvii (2012), 24-45. 
7 Sean Cunningham, Prince Arthur: The Tudor King Who Never Was (Stroud, 2016); David Grummitt, 
‘Household, Politics and Political Morality in the Reign of Henry VII’, Historical Research, 82 (2009), 
393-411. 
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any other wise.’ Moreover, no-one from the city was to ride out of the city to become 
involved in local disorder. Instead they were ‘to be abiding and attending at all 
seasons bothe of warre and of peax in the same oure citie for the defens and suretie 
therof.’ Henry’s professed reason for writing to Carlisle was that the city was ‘oon of 
the chief keyes and fortsessies to the defense of this our Realm’ and that a Scottish 
invasion would not just be detrimental to the city of Carlisle but ‘a great and an 
universal hurt to all oure said Reame.’ These opening phrases may at first be regarded 
as a formulaic greeting to a border town but, when viewed in its immediate context, 
the greeting reflects particular circumstance. The letter was sent four months after 
Perkin Warbeck, the pseudo Richard IV, had been captured at Beaulieu Abbey and 
five months after a brief Scottish invasion of the North East led by James IV.8 The 
letter was a reaction to those events. 
In contrast to many of the documents produced by England’s government in 
the Middle Ages, which were of a routine nature and therefore not necessarily direct 
evidence of a particular king’s interest in a matter, the context in which this document 
was produced suggests that Henry VII took a personal interest in the issues addressed. 
Henry VII is known to have taken a great personal interest in overseeing the routine 
administration of government as evident by the fact that he regularly signed his own 
accounts.9 Although the king’s signature on a privy seal letter is only evidence for his 
involvement in the administrative process, and not necessarily a produce of his own 
initiative, the connections made in the letter to rebellion and a possible Scottish 
invasion indicate that this was an issue the king himself was concerned about in 
February 1498. The letter examined here was not part of the routine process of 
government administration but was sent because of particular circumstances that 
attracted Henry’s attention. This article explores these circumstances and explains 
why Henry made the decision to write to Carlisle. 
Furthermore, the document discussed here illustrates the importance of 
Carlisle and its surrounding region in England during Henry VII’s reign. David Yorth 
has claimed that the North West has rarely sparked the interest of fifteenth-century 
                                                          
8 The most detail account of the conspiracy is: Ian Arthurson, The Perkin Warbeck Conspiracy, 1491-
1499 (Stroud, 1994). For the role of James IV in the conspiracy and his invasion of England see in 
particular: Norman MacDougall, James IV (East Linton, 1997), 117-38 
9 Cunningham, Henry VII, 143. 
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historians, a dearth of interest that possibly has been caused by ‘an ostensible lack of 
source material’ and the fact the region played a minimal role in events of national 
significance, with the exception of a few infractions.10 With the exception of Henry 
Summerson’s two volume study covering the entire Middle Ages, the city of Carlisle 
is rarely discussed in the context of Henry VII’s reign.11 A recent wide ranging study 
on Henry VII’s ‘New Men’ and their significance in the fledgling Tudor regime 
includes only three indexed references to Carlisle itself.12 The letter examined here 
shows that, although on the periphery of the kingdom, Carlisle was strategically 
important in times of foreign war and domestic unrest. This strategic importance was 
particularly pertinent in Henry VII’s reign as his position was never entirely secure 
and the eventual succession of his son was no mere formality, a problem exacerbated 
by the king’s problematic relations with large areas of the North. It is only with 
hindsight that Bosworth can be regarded as final dynastic change of late medieval 
England and for contemporaries further usurpations were perfectly conceivable.13 
Sean Cunningham’s work in particular has illuminated the various methods Henry 
used to ensure the loyalty of his new subjects and remind them of their obligations of 
the crown, primarily by the use of bonds of allegiance, particularly in the North.14  
Furthermore, remote areas of the kingdom in which royal power was likely to 
be weaker had a greater reputation for lawlessness and rebellion. Despite this, little 
work has focused directly on Carlisle, a city that was a remote centre far away from 
the centres of royal authority. The distance of Carlisle from the main centres of 
English royal power has been noted for the sixteenth century for which it has been 
argued that ‘the politics of Edinburgh had a more immediate impact on the area than 
those of London.’ With the exception of Kendal ‘most of Cumbria had closer contacts 
                                                          
10 David M. Yorth, ‘Sir Christopher Moresby of Scaleby and Winderemere, c. 1441-99’, Northern 
History, 53 (2016), 173. 
11 Henry Summerson, Medieval Carlisle: The City and the Borders From the Late Eleventh to the Mid-
Sixteenth Century, 2 vols. (1993), 466-75. 
12 Steven Gunn, Henry VII’s New Men & the Making of Tudor England (Oxford, 2016), 10, 90-1, 256. 
For a further wide ranging study of the reign based on extensive archival material that has only one 
reference to the city of Carlisle see: Cavill, The English Parliaments of Henry VII, 169. 
13 Michael Hicks, Wars of the Roses (London, 2010), 233. 
14 Sean Cunningham, ‘Henry VII and Rebellion in North-Eastern England: Bonds of Allegiance and the 
Establishment of Tudor Authority’, Northern History, 32 (1996), 42-74; Idem, ‘Henry VII, Sir Thomas 
Butler and the Stanley Family: Regional Politics and the Assertion of Royal Influence in North 
Western England’, in Social Attitudes and Political Structures in the Fifteenth Century, ed. Tim 
Thornton, (Stroud, 2002), 220-41; Idem, ‘The Establishment of the Tudor Regime: Henry VII, 
Rebellion and the Financial Control of the Aristocracy’, (PhD thesis, Lancaster University, 1995). 
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with Scotland than with the south.’15 During 1497 Carlisle became a closed town as 
the North was placed under martial law.16 Carlisle was an important military centre on 
the Scottish border and the king needed to be certain of the loyalty of its inhabitants. 
The letter is not a new discovery. It was printed in Ian Arthurson’s Perkin 
Warbeck Conspiracy as illustrative material but the significance of the document was 
not explained.17 To my knowledge the letter has only been cited on two other 
publications. The most recent citation of this letter is found in Claire Etty’s 
discussions of royal administration of the West March,18 but the discussion of the 
document is limited to only quoting Henry’s address to the city as ‘oon of the chief 
keyes and fortressese to the defense of thise oure Realme.’ A more detailed discussion 
of this document was given by Henry Summerson who cited the letter as an example 
of how Henry VII took steps to ensure the loyalty of men from the North West since 
he had ‘good reason for doubting the loyalty of at least some.’19 This, however, only 
partially explains the significance of this document. Successive English kings in the 
late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries sent writs to various towns and lordships 
regarding illegal retaining and the distribution of liveries.20 However, there are two 
novel features of this particular letter that distinguish it from the rest, namely a 
reference to the Scots and a requirement for the city’s government to swear fealty of 
Henry VII. The letter is illustrative of key facets of Henry VII’s reign, including his 
concerns about the loyalty of the North West, his attitude towards retaining and 
bastard feudalism and his concerns about a potential Scottish invasion. The document 
                                                          
15 M.A Clark, ‘Reformation in the Far North: Cumbria and the Church, 1500-1571’, Northern History, 
32, (1996) 76, 78. 
16 Cunningham, Henry VII, 86. 
17 Arthurson, Perkin Warbeck Conspiracy, 221-2. It should be noted that Arthurson misdates the letter 
to 15 February 1497 even though the dating clause clearly refers to the thirteenth year of Henry VII’s 
reign which was 22 August 1497 to 21 August 1498. In addition, Arthurson did not cite the letter as 
evidence to support any arguments made in his study therefore the implications of this mis-dating for 
his discussion of the Warbeck conspiracy is uncertain. 
18 Claire Etty, ‘“Noo Man Indented for the Keping of the Borders”: Royal Administration of the 
Marches, 1483-1509’, in England and Scotland at War, c. 1296-c. 1513, eds. Andy King and David 
Simpkin (Leiden and Boston, 2012), 338-9. 
19 Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, 473. 
20 See below for such letters sent by Edward IV and Richard III. For other letters sent by Henry VII that 
survive in urban archive see: The York House Books, 1461-1490, 2 vols, ed. Lorraine Attreed (Stroud, 
1991) ii, 521 (to York, 19 November 1486); H.M.C, 1st Report, Appendix (London: H.M.S.O., 1874), 
107 (to Wells, August 1497); Records of the Borough of Leicester, Volume 2: 1327-1509, ed. M. 
Bateson (London, 1901), 354. For those sent by Henry VII to the duchy of Lancaster see: The National 
Archives: Public Record Office, London, DL37/62 rott. 4, 5, 6d, 14, 17d, 19, 21, 30d, 41, 42d. I intend 
to produce a detailed examination these writs in detail in a separate article. 
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also illustrates broader policies of Yorkist and Tudor kings had towards retaining in 
towns and the role of urban governments in upholding the king’s laws. 
 
Henry VII and Noble Retaining 
The letter was first and foremost concerned with retaining within the city of Carlisle. 
Retaining by the distribution of noble livery, and later indentures, oaths and other 
means, had been restricted by a series of laws passed between the late fourteenth and 
early sixteenth centuries.21 During Henry VII’s reign, three parliaments discussed the 
issue of retaining. Those present at Henry’s first parliament after Bosworth swore an 
oath stating that they would not ‘receyve, aide ne comfort any persone openly cursed 
murderer, felon or outlawed man for felony’ or prevent them being arrested or retain 
men by livery or indenture contrary to the law.22 The 1487 parliament passed a further 
act that prohibited the retaining of the king’s tenants.23 The final parliament of the 
reign in 1504 passed an act regarding retainers that continued allowing certain 
categories of men to be retained but also allowed nobles to retain more men provided 
they obtained a royal license. It was the most rigorous of all the acts regulating the 
distribution of livery and retaining fees that the English parliament passed at any 
point.24  
Henry VII’s policy towards noble retaining was traditionally interpreted one 
facet of a conscious policy to break the independent power of the old nobility and 
assert royal dominance.25 For Geoffrey Elton the Tudor Court only became the centre 
of social and political life with the accession of Henry VIII because ‘the true Court of 
our imagination could not exist until the Crown had destroyed all alternative centres 
                                                          
21 For specific acts see: Alan Cameron, ‘The giving of livery and retaining in Henry VII’s reign’, 
Renaissance & Modern Studies, 18 (1974): 17-35; M.A. Hicks, ‘The 1468 Statute of Livery’, 
Historical Research, 64 (1991): 15-28; Gordon McKelvie, ‘The Livery Act of 1429’ in Fifteenth 
Century XIV: Essays in Honour of Michael Hicks, ed. Linda Clark (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2015), 55-
65; Nigel Saul, ‘The Commons and the Abolition of Badges’, Parliamentary History, 9 (1990), 302-15. 
22 Parliamentary Rolls of Medieval England, eds. Christopher Given-Wilson et al., 16 vols. 
(Woodbridge, 2005), xv, 131-2. 
23 PROME, xv, 375-6. 
24 Ibid, xvi, 365-7. 
25 E.g. S.T. Bindoff, Tudor England (Harmondsworth, 1950), 29; Anthony Goodman, The New 
Monarchy: England, 1471-1534 (Oxford, 1988), 52 – ‘The larger aim of Henry VII’s policy seems to 
have been to discipline the magnates’. 
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of political loyalty or … all alternative sources of worldly advancement’.26 The 
implicit premise in Elton’s argument was that it was Henry VIII’s father, Henry VII, 
who had destroyed the political independence of the nobility. Some cases had clear 
political overtones. The clearest example in the North was Henry’s attack on the 
power of the Stanley family, who were the leading family in the North West at the 
start of his reign. They were also Henry’s step family after the mother of Henry’s 
mother Margaret Beaufort to Thomas Stanley, earl of Derby. The most dramatic 
attack on the family’s power was in February 1495 with the execution of William 
Stanley.27 There were also various indictments against the family for illegal livery and 
retaining across the north of England. An entry in one of Henry VII’s Chamber Books 
states that on 22 July 1504 ‘tharchbisshope of yorke sent a rolle of parchment by 
master magnus wherin er compiled certyrn endictments made aygents master Stanley 
concerning his reteyndors’.28 This may be a reference to Thomas Stanley’s fifth son, 
Edward Stanley, lord Monteagle, who was accused of illegal livery in Yorkshire in 
1504.29 However, it may also be a reference to his brother James Stanley who was 
indicted on several occasions for illegal livery. He was indicted in 1499 while rector 
of Manchester College for illegally retaining three gentlemen and eleven yeomen 
from Toft along with sixteenth yeomen from Mobberley in October 149630 and was 
also indicted in Yorkshire in 1500.31 He was again indicted in Yorkshire in 1500 for 
illegally distributing badges five years earlier as part of a larger cluster of cases in 
Yorkshire at that time.32 It is also likely that he was indicted again in 1506, since a list 
of outstanding recognisances and debts owed to Henry VIII early in his reign records 
debts of £145,610 for Stanley and £58,644 for his retainers.33 Such a large fine 
enabled Henry VII to put financial pressure on James Stanley with the intention of 
ensuring his future loyalty and good behaviour. 
                                                          
26 G.R. Elton, ‘Presidential Address: Tudor Government: The Points of Contact. III. The Court’, TRHS, 
26 (1976), 212. 
27 For Henry’s relations with the Stanleys in relation to governing the north-west see: Cunningham, 
‘Henry VII, Sir Thomas Butler and the Stanley Family’, 220-41. 
28 British Library, London, Add MS. 21,480 fol. 189. 
29 TNA, KB29/134 rot. 26. 
30 TNA, CHES25/18 rot. 13. 
31 TNA, KB8/3/1 ms. 5. 
32 TNA, KB8/3/1 ms. 5. 
33 Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII, Vol. 1, 1509-1514, ed. J.S. 
Brewer, (London, 1920), no. 309; Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, ed. C.G. Bayne and W.H 
Dunham, Selden Society, 75 (London), p. cxxi, fn. 1. 
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The only comparable example from Henry VII’s reign is indictment of George 
Neville, lord Bergavenny in 1507 for illegally retaining 471 men.34 The number of 
men illegal retained was most likely interpreted as an attempt by Bergavenny to raise 
a private army in the same year that one of the few remaining Yorkist claimants, 
Edmund de la Pole, duke of Suffolk was imprisoned in England. Bergavenny was 
fined over £70,65035 which was ‘a fine which no one at the time could possibly have 
paid’.36 The fine was far greater than the capital value of all his English estates and he 
was never in possession of his Welsh marcher lordship of Abergavenny which left 
him ‘at the king’s mercy’.37 His movements were restricted and he was barred from 
entering the counties of Kent, Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire without royal consent. 
Since the size of the fine imposed on Bergavenny was less than half of the amount 
imposed on James Stanley, Sean Cunningham has estimated that Stanley’s illegal 
retinue may have consisted of as many as 1000 men.38 Indictments against the Stanley 
family for illegal retaining were one method by which Henry VII attempted to break 
their regional hegemony in the North West. Although his letter to Carlisle did not 
have the explicit intention of attacking the power of a particular noble family, or even 
a section of society, it is another example of the ways in which Henry linked 
unlimited retaining to threats to his sovereignty. 
The records of the King’s Bench show that Henry was keen to ensure that the 
statutes were upheld and that those offending were prosecuted. This is clearly shown 
by the fact that over one third of the cases against the statutes of livery between 1390 
and 1520 that can be identified occurred during Henry VII’s reign.39 Yet, to view 
either Henry VII as simply a king determined to break the private power of the 
nobility is unrealistic and does not stand up to recent studies that emphasise Henry’s 
                                                          
34 TNA, KB29/136 rott. 16-17. 
35 TNA, KB27/985 rex rott. 7-8, fines. 
36 J.R Lander, ‘Bonds, Coercion and Fear: Henry VII and the Peerage’, in Florilegium Historiale, ed. 
J.G. Rowe and W.H Stockdale (Toronto, 1971), 344. 
37 T.B. Pugh, ‘Henry VII and the English Nobility’, in The Tudor Nobility, ed. G.W Bernard 
(Manchester, 1992), 70. TNA, E36/214 fol. 263 records payments due on Candlemas 1508 from 
Bergavenny for his debts to the crown, which must have included his fine for illegal retaining. 
38 Cunningham, ‘St Oswald’s Priory, Nostell v Stanley’, 153. 
39 Gordon McKelvie, ‘The Legality of Bastard Feudalism: The Statutes of Livery, 1390 to c. 1520’, 
(PhD thesis, University of Winchester, 2013) 66, 94. 
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reliance on members of the old nobility in running England.40 The law permitted 
retaining provided it was within the define terms. Moreover, the 1504 act allowed 
nobles to increase the size of their affinities provided such retaining was approved by 
the king and they obtained a license.41 
There were significant variations in the number of case cases for illegal livery 
between different counties.42 These variations are known from the cases of illegal 
livery and retaining that are found in the records of the King’s Bench. Although other 
courts such as the Star Chamber heard cases relating to local feuding, illegal livery 
and retaining are only mentioned in such cases incidentally and are not the reason for 
the accusation.43 Henry VII also used various bonds and financial pressures on 
members of his nobility not to retain contrary to the statutes, though for many who 
were placed under bonds not to illegally retain are not known to have been indicted 
for the offence.44 It should also be noted that counting cases of a particular crime is 
evidence for differing levels of enforcement between the counties and does not 
necessarily represent differing levels of illegal retaining between counties. Many 
instances of illegal retaining may not have been indicted and therefore leave no trace 
in the surviving records.  
The two counties with the most cases were in the North, Cheshire and 
Yorkshire, both of which had, at various times, reputations of lawlessness and 
violence. Twenty-nine cases from Yorkshire during Henry VII’s reign are known.45 
Yet, other northern counties recorded no instance of illegal retaining, including 
Cumbria, Northumberland and Westmorland. Although an act of 1429 stated 
explicitly that the law was to be enforced in the palatinates of Cheshire and 
Lancashire, the only known instance in Lancashire was a private prosecution in 
1429.46 Explanations for the lack of cases in the North-West (with the exception of 
Cheshire) can only be speculative but it is reasonable to assume that their distance 
                                                          
40 James Ross, ‘A Governing Elite? The Higher Nobility in the Yorkist and Early Tudor Period’ in The 
Yorkist Age: Proceedings of the 2011 Harlaxton Symposium, eds. Hannes Kleineke and Christian Steer 
(Donnington, 2013), 95-115. 
41 PROME, xvi, 365-7 
42 McKelvie, ‘The Legality of Bastard Feudalism’, 71-93, 95-6. 
43 Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, pp. cxxii-cxxiv. 
44 McKelvie, ‘The Legality of Bastard Feudalism’, 204. 
45 Ibid, 72-5. 
46 TNA, PL15/2 rot. 2; PROME, ix, 402-3. For the significance of this act in relation to the palatinate 
counties see: McKelvie, ‘Livery Act of 1429’, 63. 
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from the centre and relatively low population were contributory factors. The fact that 
wardens of the marches were exempt from the statutes and could retain as many men 
as they deemed necessary47 may have made local justices in those counties lax about 
enforcing the statutes, even though it was only the wardens themselves who were not 
bound by the statutes, not all of the inhabitants of the marches. Henry VII did not 
write to Carlisle because a flurry of cases came to his attention. Similarly, the letter 
makes no mention of lack of enforcement of the statutes in Carlisle or its hinterland. 
Many letters to local officials about retaining identified specific concerns and 
problems caused or exacerbated by illegal retaining. For instance, in 1494 Henry VII 
wrote to the steward of the honour of Pickering stating that he had been informed 
about poaching in his woods and blamed unlawful retaining as a method employed by 
such offenders to gather men for such purposes.48 In order to understand the full 
significance of the letter it is important to understand why a fifteenth-century English 
king would write to a town about illegal retaining. 
 
The Crown and Urban Retaining 
Henry’s letter to Carlisle was concerned with preventing nobles from retaining men 
from the city illegally. The dominant figure in Carlisle and the surrounding area was 
Thomas, lord Dacre, who was warden on the west march when Henry wrote to 
Carlisle.49 Although Dacre owed his position to Richard III, he made peace with 
Henry VII soon after he became king. Henry seems to have been distrustful of Dacre, 
placing him under several bonds and recognisances to ensure his good behaviour and 
appears to have had a ‘deliberate policy to keep him as poor as possible’.50 The other 
key men in the region were Sir John Musgrove, Sir Richard Salkeld, keeper of the 
city, and Sir Christopher Moresby. All of these men were utilised by Henry VII in the 
maintenance of law and order in Carlisle and the surrounding area and all had social, 
financial and political links with the city and its government. Henry VII was 
                                                          
47 PROME, xiii, 65; xiii, 386. 
48 TNA, DL37/62 rot. 21. 
49 For this paragraph, unless otherwise stated, see: Steven G. Ellis, ‘A Border Baron and the Tudor 
State: The Rise and Fall of Thomas, Lord Dacre of the North’, The Historical Journal, 35 (1992), 253-
77; Steven G. Ellis, ‘Dacre, Thomas, second Baron Dacre of Gilsland (1467–1525)’, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.winchester.idm.oclc.org/view/article/50220, accessed 14 April 2017]; 
Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, 466-76; Yorth, ‘Sir Christopher Moresby’, 182-8. 
50 Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, 468 
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somewhat distrustful of these men and viewed them with suspicion, especially Dacre. 
Yet, the letter was not simply a means by which he intended to prevent a small group 
of gentry from retaining within the city. Instead, the letter was addressed to those who 
were responsible for upholding the king’s laws and reveals Henry’s concerns about 
retaining within the city and the threat of a Scottish invasion. To fully appreciate this 
point, it is necessary to consider Henry VII’s general views on retaining in towns. 
Discussions of noble retaining and bastard feudalism have tended to 
concentrate on the relationship between members of the peerage and members of the 
gentry.51 Implicit in this focus is the assumption that towns and townsmen did not 
operate within this system. In part this assumption was caused by an overemphasis by 
historians on the indenture of retainer as the main document for studying bastard 
feudalism, when in fact the indenture is only one of several types of document that 
illuminate such relationships.52 Carlisle was unusual because it is the only major town 
or city whose inhabitants are known to have been retained by indenture by a member 
of the peerage. Two such indenture survive, the earliest of which was drawn-up on 24 
June 1461 when Richard Neville, earl of Warwick, as warden of the West March, 
retained John Faucon of Carlisle, gunner, for life. The indenture stated that Faucon 
would array men to ride with Warwick and giving the earl one third of any spoils of 
war.53 The reason why this particular indenture deviates from the traditional magnate-
gentry model was because of Carlisle’s location on the edge of the Scottish border 
which meant it was at a greater risk of raiding. Warwick’s position as Warden of the 
Marches meant that he was expected to retain men in this area to contribute to the 
defence of the realm.54 The only other similar indenture was between Warwick’s 
successor as warden, Richard, duke of Gloucester and another prominent citizen of 
Carlisle, Henry Denton in 1473 who went on to be mayor in 1478 and 1480.55 The 
two indentures further attest to the military importance of Carlisle and suggests that 
                                                          
51 The classic discussion of the topic remains K.B. McFarlane, ‘Bastard Feudalism’, Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research, 20 (1947 for 1945), 161-80. 
52 See in particular: Michael Hicks, Bastard Feudalism (London, 1995) 
53 ‘Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War’, eds. Michael Jones and Simon Walker, 
Camden Miscellany, xiii (1994), no. 140.  
54 The Wardens of the Marches were permitted to retain as many men as they required under the law 
regarding retaining: PROME, viii, 38; xiii, 65, 386. 
55 ‘Private Indentures’, no. 153; Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, ii, 463. 
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the town’s location on the Scottish border led to it being more militarized than the 
majority of English towns at this time.  
Although townsmen only feature in two known indentures of retainer, other 
types of records from the nobility show that they were willing to incorporate 
townsmen into their affinities.56 One prominent example from Henry VII’s reign is 
the list of men retained by Sir Thomas Lovell under the 1504 act. Those named were 
men retained by Lovell who were not resident in his household or acting as estate 
officials but men that Henry VII permitted him to retain in order to boost his own 
personal powerbase. There was a clear urban dimension to this powerbase as the list 
included men from Lichfield, Walsall, Derby, St Albans and Oxford.57 The high status 
of some of the men retained is indicated by the fact that four former mayors and three 
future mayors of Walsall were retained by Lovell.58 Henry VII accepted nobles 
retaining townsmen provided it was within the accepted parameters. 
The fact that townsmen could become embroiled in bastard feudal relationship 
was recognised in the parliamentary debates about noble liveries. A Commons’ 
petition presented to the 1393 Parliament complained about the lack of enforcement, 
stating that those engaged in these disruptive practices included ‘plusours taillours, 
drapers, souters, tanners, pisceners, bochers, et autres artificers, et auxi menuez 
gentz’. The resultant act stated that no yeoman or anyone below the rank of esquire, 
which therefore included the townsmen referred to in the petition, was to wear livery 
unless he continually served in a lord’s household.59 A later act from 1429 permitted 
mayors to distribute liveries while in office.60 In addition to townsmen being 
identified as participants in bastard feudal relationships, and their involvement in such 
relationships being regulated but not prohibited in law, urban governments themselves 
had a legal obligation to ensure that the statutes were upheld and that those who 
contravened the statues were prosecuted. The 1468 Act which extended the law to 
include retaining by indenture also gave to the relevant civic officials in ‘within eny 
                                                          
56 For the importance of looking beyond the indenture of retainer to identify the full extent of a bastard 
feudal affinity see: Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, 43-68. 
57 HMC, Report 24: Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Rutland, iv (London, 1908), 559-66. 
58 Steven Gunn, ‘Sir Thomas Lovell (c. 1449-1524): A New Man for a New Monarchy?’, in The End of 
the Middle Ages? England in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, ed. John L. Watts (Stroud, 1998), 
119. 
59 PROME, vii, 239-40. 
60 Ibid, ix, 402-3. 
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such cite, burgh, towne port’ the power to hear cases.61 This clause formalised certain 
existing practices as earlier charters had given the right to hear and determine livery 
cases to Norwich in 145262, Canterbury in 145363, Derby in 145964 and Rochester65 
and Colchester in 1462.66 Such towns therefore had a legal responsibility to ensure 
that illegal retaining was not happening within their walls. 
Henry VII employed a logical tactic when he wrote to urban governments 
given the need to delegate power in fifteenth-century England. Medieval government 
was a partnership between the king and his richest subjects which were the nobility, 
upper ranks of the clergy and urban elites.67 Henry had previously used urban 
governments to ensure that laws about retaining were communicated to the wider 
population and that it was expected they would be obeyed. On 16 February 1489 
Henry wrote to the mayor and bailiffs of the town of Lancaster ordering them to make 
a proclamation that no one in the town to was retain or be retained by any means ‘but 
as may and shal accord with oure lawes’ or to come to any assemblies unless 
responding to a commission or commandment.68 Likewise, Henry’s letter was 
addressed to the mayor and brethren of Carlisle because they were the men ultimately 
responsible for maintaining law and order within the city.  
Yet, the value of urban governments to the king extended beyond this, which 
made mayors and other officials the obvious recipients of such letters. English towns 
had various rights and liberties. Kings, in general, respected their autonomy, though 
they did need to ensure that local mayors and civic officials were men upon whom 
they could rely to do their bidding if necessary.69 In England, urban government was 
an extension of royal government, not an alternative source of authority. Henry’s 
letter to Carlisle does not represent any deviation from the norms of acceptable royal 
                                                          
61 Ibid, xiii, 384-5. 
62 Calendar of Charter Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Volume VI, 1427-1516 (London, 
1927), 115. 
63 Ibid, 124. 
64 Ibid, 132. 
65 Ibid, 151. 
66 Ibid, 179. 
67 Gerald Harriss, ‘Political Society and the Growth of Government in Late Medieval England’, Past 
and Present, no. 138 (1993), 28-57. 
68 TNA, DL37/62 rot. 4. 
69 James Lee, ‘Urban Policy and Urban Political Culture: Henry VII and his Towns’, Historical 
Research, lxxxii (2009), 493-510. For a similar theme in the context of the early fifteenth century see: 
Given-Wilson, Henry IV, 429-34. 
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conduct in relational to towns and was not concerned with the city’s government, as 
an institution, retaining men. The authority that the mayor and brethren enjoyed came 
directly from the king who, in return, expected his laws to be upheld, order to be 
maintained within his kingdom and his sovereignty supported. Failure to uphold royal 
law jeopardised those urban liberties which towns cherished and fiercely guarded. If 
laws were not upheld, Henry VII was willing to directly interfere in urban 
government, as evident in two letters he sent to the city of York. In 1486 Henry wrote 
to York about retaining and included a thinly veiled threat to the mayor, aldermen, 
sheriffs and common counsel of York saying that ‘if ye shew your self remise or 
negligent in thexecucion of this our commaundement, we shall soo correct and ley the 
default theror to your discharge, that it shalbe to heavy for you to bere the same, ye 
may be assured’.70 Nine years later Henry VII threatened the mayor of York, stating 
that he would replace the city’s magistrates if they did not keep the king’s peace.71 By 
writing such letters to urban governments Henry employed the same tactics that he 
used with the nobility which was to utilise their own power structures for the benefit 
of the crown. 
 
Developing Yorkist Policies 
Henry VII was not the first English king to write to an urban government reminding 
them of their duty to ensure illegal retaining did not occur within the town’s walls and 
was able to modify letters sent by previous kings to suit his particular objectives. 
Richard III sent letters to the mayors and other officials in Burton, Bedford, 
Canterbury, Northampton and Southampton as well as several of his lordships.72 Two 
letters sent by Edward IV to urban authorities about retaining in particular display 
similar concerns to those expressed in Henry’s letter to Carlisle. Edward IV’s first 
known letter on the topic, dated 9 January 1470, was addressed to the bailiff, 
burgesses and inhabitants of Scarborough prohibiting anyone from taking the livery of 
‘eny lord or estate whatsouer’. The letter’s preamble suggests that Edward was 
                                                          
70 The York House Books, 1461-1490, 2 vols, ed. Lorraine Attreed (Stroud, 1991) ii, 521. 
71 YCR, ii, 115-16. See also: Christian Liddy, ‘Urban Enclosure Riots: The Risings of the Commons in 
English Towns, 1480-1525’, Past and Present, no. 226 (2015): 74-5. 
72 British Library, Harleian Manuscript 433, ed. Rosemary Horrox and P.W Hammond, 4 vols. 
(Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1979), ii, 10. 19, 69-70, 81, 162-3, 166-7; HMC, 11th Report, Appendix, Part 
3: The Manuscripts of the Corporations of Southampton and King’s Lynn (London, 1887), 16. 
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concerned that livery would be distributed in order to raise troops against him, not just 
to conduct a private feud: ‘yet neither arise ne stirre towar ony Journay at the request 
or desire of eny persone whatsoever he been onlesse thon ye have a special 
commaundement from vs in that bihalue.’73 The timing of the letter suggests that it 
was part of Edward IV’s more general concerns about the security of his throne. 
When Edward wrote to Scarborough he was in the midst of attempting to reconcile 
with his brother George, duke of Clarence, and Richard Neville, earl of Warwick, 
after their coup in 1469. The coup which led to Edward’s temporary imprisonment in 
late summer 1469 after the Battle of Edgecot began in the guise of a popular uprising 
led by Robin of Redesdale centred in Warwick’s estates in Richmondshire.74 ‘[O]ny 
Journay’ must have meant accompanying a noble who was in open rebellion against 
the king. In the context of 1469 this must have been a veiled reference to Warwick 
and Clarence. Scarborough’s close proximity to the centre of the rebellion is likely to 
have left the town, and indeed most of the region, under suspicion. The letter indicates 
Edward’s concern about the threat of retaining in the region associated with Robin of 
Redesdale’s uprising and the potential for retaining to be the method used by a 
rebellious faction to increase its manpower. Henry’s letter to Carlisle similarly reveals 
a concern that retaining would be a method used to quickly increase the military 
strength of a rebellious faction. 
The second letter, dated 11 February 1472, was addressed to the mayor and 
sheriffs of Coventry and ordered that no one in the town was to retain anyone by 
grants of liveries or retaining fees ‘contrarie to our laws & statutes ordeigned & 
prouided in suche behalfe’.75 The recent rebellion of Warwick and Clarence seems to 
have prompted Edward IV to write to Coventry. The letter’s preamble highlighted the 
public order problems and made the connection between disorder and rebellion, 
referring to the second phase of the Wars of the Roses: ‘Callyng to our 
Remembraunce and consderacion the gret tempests, diusions & troubles that in late 
daies haue be in this our Reaume’. Edward then stated that his order was ‘for the 
                                                          
73 North Yorkshire Country Record Office, DC/SCB, White Velum Book of Scarborough, f. 53. I 
would like to thank Professor Michael Hicks for supplying me with his transcription of this document. 
74 Michael Hicks, Warwick the Kingmaker (Oxford, 1998), 270-8; A.J. Pollard, Warwick the 
Kingmaker: Politics, Power and Fame (London, 2007), 67. 
75 The Coventry Leet Book or Mayor’s Register, 1420-1555, ed. M.D. Harris (London, 1907-1913), i, 
374. 
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pacificacion, defence, and suretee of the same our land and subgittes, both inwards & 
outwards’.76 Coventry was a staunch Lancastrian town during the 1450s and the 
‘Parliament of Devils’ that oversaw the attainder of the Yorkist Lords was held there 
in October 1459.77 The town supported Warwick and Clarence during the second 
phase of the Wars of the Roses and was made to pay 400 marks to Edward IV to 
restore its liberties.78 In short, Coventry was a town with a history of opposition to 
Edward IV and the king wanted to ensure that the town would not become a hotbed of 
illegal retaining. Like the letter that Henry VII sent to Carlisle, Edward IV’s letter to 
Coventry about retaining was targeted at a town in which the loyalty of the inhabitants 
of the region was uncertain.  
Although Henry followed the broad patterns in writing to local governments 
established by his Yorkist predecessors, he also adapted them. Henry’s letter to 
Carlisle is the only surviving letter which ordered the city’s government to swear 
oaths of fealty to the bishop of Carlisle so that ‘the same oure citie maye be of good 
suretue and trouthes amonges yourself.’ They were also to tender their own sureties to 
the bishop. This was part of a broader strategy that Henry employed throughout his 
reign to remind his subjects of their obligations and responsibilities to the crown. On 
several occasion Henry made his subjects swear oaths that they would not illegally 
retain. The lords and MPs who attended Henry’s first parliament were made to swear 
an oath stating that they would not illegally retain.79 He also made those with a more 
personal connection to him swear separate oaths on the matter, including officials of 
the duchy of Lancaster who swore an oath stating that they would not be retained by 
anyone else.80 The fact that this was part of a more general policy that Henry was 
employing around this time is show by the fact that the oath seems to have been 
recorded in the spring or summer of 1497. An inscription top of the folio on which the 
oath for the attorney of the duchy of Lancaster is an entry regarding the honour of 
Pevensey dated to 29 May 1497.81 It is likely that the oath was recorded soon after 
this entry and therefore around eight months before he sent the letter to Carlisle. 
                                                          
76 Coventry Leet Book, i, 373-5. 
77 Michael Hicks, The Wars of the Roses (London, 2010) 140-7.  
78 Coventry Leet Book, i, 367-9. See also: Ross, Edward IV, 182-3. 
79 PROME, xv, 131-2. 
80 TNA, DL5/3 fol. 152d, 153. 
81 TNA, DL5/3 fol. 153. 
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 Moreover, the requirement for the city’s government to swear oaths of fealty 
to the king demonstrates the intersection of royal and urban political cultures as oaths 
were an important facet of urban society. Swearing oaths was an important public 
event and holders of office needed to take them before taking up their positions.82 The 
man who was supposed to hear the oaths was not an important secular figure of 
importance like Thomas, Lord Dacre, Sir Richard Salkeld or Sir Christopher 
Moresby, all of whom were given various roles for the region’s defence by Henry VII. 
This may have been caused by Henry’s apparent distrust of many of the leading men 
of the region.83 Responsibility for taking the oaths was instead given to William 
Sever, bishop of Carlisle. Sever is not known to have had a close personal relationship 
the king but he was a key member of Henry VII’s government. For instance, he was 
named on two commissions to arrange a marriage alliance with James IV in 1496 and 
1497.84 He was also known to have been close to Reginald Bray and later became a 
member of the Henry’s Council Learned in Law, acting as one of the council’s agents 
across the North West.85 His later appointment as a surveyor of the king’s prerogative 
at some point in 1499 is illustrative of his abilities as the role involved maintaining a 
close oversight of the king’s fiscal and feudal rights.86 Sever’s secular authority as one 
of the king’s agent who helped him govern the region was likely augmented by the 
spiritual authority he had as bishop which would give additional weight to any oath 
taken. 
                                                          
82 For the importance of oaths in late medieval and early modern English towns see: Christian D. 
Liddy, “‘Sir ye be not kyng’: Citizenship and Speech in Late Medieval and Early Modern England”, 
The Historical Journal, First view [early online publication]; James Lee, “‘Ye shall disturbe noe mane 
right’: Oath-taking and Oath-breaking in Late Medieval and Early Modern Bristol”, Urban History, 34 
(2007), 27-38. 
83 Ellis, ‘A Border Baron and the Tudor’, 253-77; Yorth, ‘Sir Christopher Moresby’, 185-7. 
84 Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, Volume 4: 1357-1509, eds. Joseph Bain (Edinburgh, 
1888), nos. 1622; 1636; Jonathan Hughes, ‘Sever, William (d. 1505)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25089, accessed 26 
Oct 2016]. 
85 Penn, Winter King, 135, 157; Sean Cunningham, ‘Henry VII's council learned in the 
law (act. c.1499–1509)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press. 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/theme/96407, accessed 5 April 2017]. 
86 Margaret Condon, ‘Ruling Elites in the Reign of Henry VII’ in Patronage, Pedigree and Power, ed. 
Charles Ross (Gloucester, 1979) 117, 137 fn. 40 notes the importance of this role and that although 
there is no evidence of the precise date of Sever’s appointment, references in Henry VII’s Chamber 
Books suggests this occurred in the spring of 1499. TNA, E101/414/16 fol. 228. For Sever’s ability in 
legal and administrative matters see also: Rachel R. Reid, King’s Council in the North (London, 1921) 
78-9; W.C. Richardson, ‘The Surveyor of the King’s Perogative’, English Historical Review, 56 (1941) 
60 fn. 2 
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 Henry’s order for oaths of fealty to be taken was part his developing policy 
regarding the loyalty of his officials and his stance on retaining. The letter was part of 
a standard royal tactic in the late fifteenth century to remind certain towns of their 
obligations to uphold the king’s laws with respect to retaining, but the letter is unusual 
because of the requirement to ensure that the city’s government swore fealty to the 
king. This was part of Henry’s general policy of exploiting all possible avenues of 
asserting royal authority and the all means available to remind his subjects of their 
duty of loyalty. The reason for the peculiarities in the letter to Carlisle can only be 
understood within the context of Henry VII’s relations with Scotland. 
 
Carlisle and Scottish Invasion 
Although Carlisle was not the only town to receive a letter from Henry VII about 
retaining, the context of the letter was different to these others because this is the only 
letter about retaining that alludes to Anglo-Scottish relations. The statement that 
Carlisle was ‘oon of the chief keyes and fortresses to the defense of this oure Reame’ 
was no mere platitude. More attention has traditionally been paid to the importance of 
the North East and its role in the defence of the realm.87 This is understandable as it 
was the North East that more often bore the brunt of Scottish invasions, as it had in 
1496.88 Yet, Carlisle and Berwick were the two major garrisoned towns on the Anglo-
Scottish border during this period and therefore needed to be secure.89 At the 
parliament of 1495 substantial revenues were assigned to Carlisle and Berwick 
because each was ‘a grete defences ageyn the Scottish and a grete wele, suretie and 
ease to all this realme, and in especiall to the north parties.’90 The act was passed 
towards the end of the parliament soon after James IV had publically declared his 
support for Perkin Warbeck. It appears that the issue was hurriedly added to the 
business of parliament in response to these developments.91 During this period the 
fledgling Tudor regime was becoming increasingly adept at combating serious 
military threats. Over the following two years, Henry’s government displayed an 
                                                          
87 The most recent study is: Steven G. Ellis, Defending English Ground: War and Peace in Meath and 
Northumberland, 1460-1542 (Oxford, 2015). 
88 MacDougall, James IV, 131-3. 
89 Ellis, Defending English Ground, 39. 
90 PROME, xvi, 216-18. 
91 As suggested by the editor of that particular roll: PROME, xvi, 139. 
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impressive ability to raise armies to combat the threats of Scottish invasions and an 
uprising in the West County.92 However, since Henry’s grip on the throne was not a 
forgone conclusion, especially if a rebellious faction was able to retain a large number 
of supporters quickly and gain the backing of a foreign army. In this respect the letter 
to Carlisle is different from all other known royal letters to towns about retaining 
because it was connected to Anglo-Scottish tensions and the Perkin Warbeck 
conspiracy. 
James IV’s support for Warbeck was part of a more general Scottish policy 
during the Wars of the Roses to offer support and assistance to opposition factions to 
help destabilise England. For instance, after the deposition of Henry VI in 1461 many 
members of the deposed Lancastrian regime sought refuge at the Scottish royal 
court.93 James IV’s minority government adopted a similar policy when they offered 
shelter to Lord Lovell who was given a safe conduct along with three other men 
shortly after the start of the reign on 19 June 1488.94 The minority government also 
received envoys from Margaret of Bugundy in 1489 and 1490.95 On 2 March 1492 
they received a letter from ‘King Edwartis son’ and Maurice Fitzgerald, earl of 
Desmond.96 ‘King Edwartis son’ was Perkin Warbeck. James was one of several 
European rulers that exploited Warbeck’s cause to advance his own position and 
Scotland’s international standing more generally.97 Treasurer’s accounts indicate that 
James IV was willing to spend money to publically demonstrate his support for 
Warbeck.98 In 1496 the Scottish exchequer paid £40 4s. 9d. for the expenses of 
Warbeck’s English servants.99 James had good reasons for supporting Warbeck, 
irrespective of his true identity. Waging foreign war, supported by his lords, helped 
                                                          
92 Sean Cunningham, ‘National War and Dynastic Politics: Henry VII’s Capacity to Wage War in the 
Scottish Campaigns of 1496-1497’ in England and Scotland at War, c. 1296-c. 1513, eds. Andy King 
and David Simpkin (Leiden and Boston, 2012), 297-328. 
93 The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, vol. 7, ed. George Burnett, (Edinburgh, 1884), 72 records a 
payment of £17 7d paid to ‘Duncan of Dundee’ for bringing Margaret of Anjou to Scotland. 
94 Registrum Magna Sigilli Regum Scotorum, ii (1434-1513), ed. J.B Pauld (Edinburgh, 1882) No. 
1738. 
95 MacDougall, James IV, 118. For a safe conduct for Richard Hardilstoun, knight, and Richard 
Ludelay of Ireland, Englishmen along with forty others on behalf of Margaret of Burgundy on 4 
November 1488 see: R.M.S., ii, no. 1798. 
96 Accounts of the High Treasurer of Scotland: Volume 1, 1473-1498, ed. Thomas Dickson (Edinburgh, 
1877), 199. 
97 For the remainder of this paragraph unless states otherwise see: MacDougall, James IV, 117-38 
passim. 
98 Accounts of the High Treasurer of Scotland, i, 256, 263, 267.  
99 The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, vol. 10, 1488-1496, ed. George Burnett, (Edinburgh, 1887), 576-7 
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James display his authority in Scotland. A bellicose policy towards his southern 
neighbours allowed James IV to distinguish himself from his father whose ‘obsession’ 
for an English alliance was one of the key reasons why many in Scotland were 
alienated from James III’s regime.100 As a symbol of Scottish support Warbeck was 
married off to Lady Catherin Gordon, who although only a minor royal figure at best 
would give Warbeck a Scottish queen if he had been successful and provide James 
with a degree of influence at the English court.101 The eventual invasion occurred in 
September 1496 when the Scottish host crossed into Northumberland. Although it 
lasted only five days and retreated when an English army approached, it was able to 
destroy at least five tower houses in the Tweed and Till and briefly laid siege to Heton 
castle. Warbeck left the force during this campaign, with James unlikely to have been 
upset to see a man whose had outstayed his usefulness to him depart from his force.102 
While the Scots were making preparations for an invasion, Henry VII was 
being passed secrets by Scottish informants who were disaffected in the aftermath of 
the Battle of Sauchieburn in 1488 when James IV usurped his father James III. 
Among them was John Ramsay, formerly Lord Bothwell who was in receipt of annual 
pension of 100 marks from Henry from 1489.103 Most of the information Ramsey 
provided with is unknown but two letters from Ramsay to Henry from just before the 
Scottish invasion survive. One of which, dated 8 September 1496, informed Henry 
that a messenger from Carlisle had come to the Scottish court from Randall of Dacre, 
brother of Thomas, Lord Dacre.104 As previously stated, Henry VII was distrustful of 
Dacre and Ramsay’s information could only have exacerbated Henry’s exiting 
concerns about Dacre and the loyalties of the keepers of Carlisle and Bewcastle as 
well as the sheriff of Westmorland.105 Indeed, such concerns seem to have continued 
as Dacre was bound under 2000 marks with sureties in January 1502 for maintaining 
                                                          
100 Norman MacDougall, ‘Response: At the Medieval Bedrock’, Scottish Historical Review, 73 (1994), 
27. On the same page MacDougall aptly described James IV as a king who ‘knew how to wrap himself 
successfully in the national flag’. 
101 Katie Stevenson, ‘Chivalry, British sovereignty and dynastic politics: undercurrents of antagonism 
in Tudor-Stewart relations, c. 1490- c. 1513’, Historical Research, 86 (2013), 603-4 
102 By July 1497 ‘James IV had determined to rid himself of the cost – and by that time the 
embarrassment – of maintaining Warbeck.’ MacDougall, James IV,  137. 
103 Ibid, 128-30. 
104 A.F. Pollard, The Reign of Henry VII from Contemporary Sources (London, 1913), no. 100. 
105 Agnes Conway, Henry VII’s Relations with Scotland and Ireland, 1485-1498 (Cambridge, 1932), 
236-9 McDougall, James IV, 130. 
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the city’s defences.106 Throughout the 1490s Henry was watchful over Carlisle and 
the North West more generally, a grip which only eased when it became more 
apparent that the Scottish threat had subsided.107 Scottish support for Warbeck’s claim 
was therefore entangled with Henry VII’s broader concerns for the stability of his 
fledgling regime and his actions conform to the traditional picture of a king who was 
watchful of potential threats to his kingship.  
Henry’s unease about the activities of the Scottish king as apparent in the date 
that the letter was sent. Five days before Henry wrote his letter to Carlisle, James IV 
had ratified a seven-year truce from the previous 30 September in front of the bishop 
of Durham and two other English ambassadors. Since this occurred at St Andrews, 
news of the ratification probably did not reach Henry before he wrote to Carlisle on 
15 February.108 Although the decision to write to Carlisle may have been taken before 
15 February, the decision to send the letter was clearly made no later than 15 February 
and therefore before Henry is likely to have received confirmation that the truce was 
ratified. This suggests that Henry was not fully confident that James would ratify the 
truce or that James could be trusted to uphold the truce. Henry’s concern that James 
could not be trusted to stick to the truce explains the concern expressed in the letter to 
Carlisle about ‘any sodein entieprins of the Scottes.’ Moreover, the fact that he had 
already captured Perkin Warbeck in October 1497 further indicates that Henry was 
well aware that the king of Scot’s was using Warbeck as a pawn and that his 
ambitions were more about destabilising England than they were with the who the 
rightful king of England was. 
The context in which this letter was written therefore indicates a fear that 
illegal retaining would destabilise border defences which the Scots could exploit. One 
possibility was that hostile northern lords would retain large groups of men to act as a 
fifth column in any potential Scottish invasion. In hindsight this seems unlikely as a 
northern rising in support of Warbeck failed to materialise in coordination with the 
raid of Ellem in 1496.109 The existing levels of xenophobia towards Scots in medieval 
England, particularly in the North which felt the full brunt of Scottish raiding 
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throughout the later middle ages made such an alliance unlikely, though perhaps not 
impossible.  
Another possible concern for Henry must have been that illegal retaining 
would cause divisions in Carlisle and the surrounding hinterland that would weaken 
the collective defensive cohesion of the region if a Scottish army was to attack. Such 
problems had arisen in another border region earlier on in his reign. In 1487, just 
before the battle of Stoke, rioting and local feuding had occurred in Leominster 
between the followings of two knights, Richard Croft and Thomas Cornewall. The 
dispute was connected to contested claims to the manor of Brymfield and about local 
dominance more generally. Both men were key members of Henry VII’s government 
in the Welsh Marches and divisions were a problem for the regime’s security in that 
part of the kingdom.110 As Henry was concerned about a potential Scottish invasion in 
early 1498, he must have been concerned about the cohesion of local elites in order to 
ensure the border was properly defended. 
Finally, similar letters which are likely now lost were probably sent to other 
northern towns and cities like Berwick and Durham, and possibly even York. 
Retaining was a concern for Henry VII in the immediate aftermath of the Warbeck 
conspiracy. Five weeks after writing to Carlisle, on 20 March 1498, Henry sent a 
similar letter to Leicester. Unlike the letter to Carlisle, which discussed the problem of 
rebellion or a potential Scottish invasion, Henry reminded Leicester’s government of 
their additional obligation to him as duke of Lancaster as well as king of England, 
noting that the town was ‘parcell of our duchie of Lancastre’. The letter went on to 
state that no one was to be retaining by ‘cloth, cognisaunce, othe or otherwise, 
contrarie to our said lawed & statutz.’111 Potential rebellion remained a concern of 
Henry’s and was undoubtedly a factor that influenced the letters he sent in February 
and March 1498.  
 
Conclusion 
Henry’s letter to Carlisle demonstrates a concern that disaffected northern lords, 
gentry and possibly even townsmen would either retain men from Carlisle thus 
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creating a fifth-column that would join a Scottish invasion, or that illegal retaining 
would exacerbate existing divisions to the hindrance of their ability to defend the 
border. The benefit of hindsight shows that there was no imminent Scottish invasion 
but nevertheless when Henry wrote to Carlisle in February 1498 the potential of a 
large scale Scottish invasion must have been foremost on his mind. Henry was 
reminding his subjects of the duties and responsibilities to him which was one of 
various tactics and strategies that he used throughout his reign, along with the use of 
bonds, in order to ensure the loyalty of his subjects and thus keep his crown. By 
writing to governments to ensure that they upheld the laws regarding liveries and 
retaining Henry reminded them of their role in the upholding of the king’s laws. He 
was able to tailor the rhetorical and the specific phrasing of certain letters to ensure 
that such statutes were upheld. In the case of Carlisle, its importance as a border 
fortification and its role in defending the kingdom against a traditional enemy was 
emphasised. In many respects Henry VII was continuing the policies of his Yorkist 
predecessors who also wrote to various urban governments urging them to restrain the 
excesses of noble retaining in their towns and cities. Henry built on these measures 
and his letter to Carlisle was not simply a copying of Yorkist practices but part of his 
development of Yorkist policies. The requirement for Carlisle’s government to swear 
oaths was a novel feature when compared to similar letters sent by Henry and his 
predecessors, and was an additional attempt to ensure the loyalty of the city in the 
face of a potential Scottish invasion. Henry’s ability to exploit the numerous means by 
which he was able to remind his subjects of their obligations to the crown was an 
important factor in allowing him to die peacefully in his bed and become the first 
English king since Henry V in 1422 never to be deposed. 
 
Cumbria Record Office, Ca2/105 
Henry by the grace of god king of England and of Ffrance and lord of Irland to the 
Maire and his bretheryn of our citie of Carlill that nowe be and heraftre for the tyme 
shalbe greting. Insomuche as ye knowe well that the same oure Citie is oon of the 
chief keyes and fortresses to the defens of this oure Reame and that the losse therof by 
any sodein entieprins of the Scottes shulde be not oonly youre aller distruction but 
also a great and an universal hurt to all oure said Reame whiche god defendes. We 
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therfor wol and charge you in oure estraitest wise not to suffice any maner of persone 
or persones dwelling within oure said citie to be from hensfurthe reteyned with any 
man be he spiritual or temporall lord or other by lyveree baggnen clothing 
cognoissance or any other wise nor to ride or passe out of the same oure citie in 
harnois to any feldes skirmysshinges affrayes or riotes with any gentilman or othre 
whatsoever estate or degre he be of but to be abiding and attending at all seasons 
bothe of warre and of peax in the same oure citie for the defens and suretie therof 
ayenst the Scottes if they wolde make any sodein attempt at therunto by siege or 
otherwise. And to thentent that ye of the same oure citie maye be of good suretue and 
trouthes amonges yourself we have commanded the Right Reverend fadre in god oure 
right trusty counseillour the Bishhop of Carlill to take your oathes of fidelitee unto us. 
Willing you therefore to be attendant unto hym in that behalve and also to conforme 
you to the due observyng of the promisses as ye tender your owne sureties and the 
weal of this our Reame. And be it soo that any man disobey and be reteyned contrary 
to this oure ordence we than charge you straitely to certifie us furthwith of his name 
by your writing and we shal soo provide for his sharp punicon according to oure laws 
and statutes as other shal therat take feez semblably toffende for tyme coming. Yeven 
under out signet at oure paloise of Westminster the xv day of Ffebruary the xiijth yere 
of oure Reigne. 
[Signed by Henry VII] 
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